Bamboo, Pivot, or Tightrope?

Thailand, Philippines & Malaysia in the US–China–Iran Triangle

Executive Summary

Southeast Asia’s three most strategically significant middle powers—Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia—are each navigating the intersecting pressures of US–China great power competition and the 2026 Iran conflict through fundamentally different doctrines. Thailand is quietly drifting into Beijing’s orbit despite its formal US treaty alliance. The Philippines has emerged as Washington’s most committed forward partner in the Indo-Pacific, but faces an acute energy crisis triggered by the very conflict its ally initiated. Malaysia, under Anwar Ibrahim, is executing a sophisticated hedging strategy that seeks to maintain equidistance from all major powers while building economic resilience through semiconductor ambitions and BRICS+ engagement.

This analysis examines how each country’s geopolitical positioning creates distinct vulnerabilities and opportunities in the context of the ongoing Iran war (Operation Epic Fury, February 2026–present), the accelerating US–China strategic competition, and the evolving ASEAN institutional architecture.

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1. Thailand: The Quiet Drift to Beijing

1.1 US–China Axis

Thailand’s alliance with the United States is one of Washington’s oldest in Asia, dating to the 1833 Treaty of Amity and Commerce. The relationship deepened through the Cold War, the Manila Pact of 1954, and Thailand’s role as a staging ground for Vietnam War operations. Bangkok was designated a major non-NATO ally in 2003.

Yet the alliance has been hollowing out for over a decade. The 2014 military coup proved to be the critical inflection point: Washington’s public criticism alienated the Thai military establishment and created an opening for Beijing. China sold Thailand nearly $400 million in arms between 2016 and 2022, approximately double US sales for the same period, covering surface-to-air missiles, radars, tanks, and a submarine deal. Reports from early 2026 indicate continued procurement of Chinese armoured vehicles.

“Thailand’s increasing ties to China accelerates the trend of the US losing strategic influence in Southeast Asia.” — Emma Chanlett-Avery, Asia Society Policy Institute

The drift is not merely military. Thailand’s digital infrastructure is deeply enmeshed with Chinese technology: Huawei networks, Alibaba cloud services, and logistics corridors that functionally serve Chinese supply chain interests. This alignment remains deniable but operationally significant, creating what analysts describe as a form of ‘functional alignment’ that bypasses formal treaty language.

1.2 Hedging Doctrine

Thailand’s traditional ‘bamboo diplomacy’ — bending with the prevailing wind without breaking — has been the guiding metaphor of Thai statecraft for centuries. In January 2026, four major political parties publicly affirmed strategic neutrality at the ‘Thailand Redesign 2026’ debate, with consensus across the political spectrum that Thailand should avoid taking sides in great-power conflicts.

However, the space for genuine equidistance is narrowing. US tariffs under the Trump administration are pushing Bangkok further toward Beijing for economic solutions, even as Thailand maintains reservations about Chinese overdependence. The October 2025 reciprocal trade framework with Washington—where Thailand agreed to cut tariffs on 99% of US goods—has not removed the underlying friction; the US retains a 19% tariff on most Thai goods.

1.3 Iran Conflict Exposure

Thailand has been relatively quiet on the 2026 Iran war, maintaining its characteristic posture of non-intervention in Middle Eastern affairs. The direct economic impact is less severe than for oil-importing neighbours, but the broader geopolitical consequences are significant: US attention and resources diverted to the Middle East reduce Washington’s focus on the Indo-Pacific, potentially easing pressure on China and reinforcing Bangkok’s calculus that Beijing is the more reliable long-term partner.

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2. Philippines: America’s Forward Outpost Under Strain

2.1 US–China Axis

The Philippines occupies the opposite end of the alignment spectrum from Thailand. Under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Manila has emerged as Washington’s most committed security partner in the Indo-Pacific. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, reinforced by the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) and the 2023 Bilateral Defense Guidelines, provides the institutional architecture for an expanding military relationship.

The numbers are striking: the US is scheduled to conduct over 500 military exercises with the Philippines in 2026, a significant escalation from previous years. The deployment of the Typhon mid-range missile system to Luzon—placing Tomahawk and SM-6 strike capability inside the First Island Chain—represents a fundamental shift in how the US projects power in the region. A Typhon battery in the Philippines can reach deep into the South China Sea and cover the Luzon Strait between Taiwan and the Philippines.

The emerging ‘Squad’ alliance (US–Japan–Australia–Philippines) is crystallizing as a China-focused security architecture. Manila’s 2024 Comprehensive Archipelagic Defensive Concept (CADC) marks a paradigm shift toward prioritizing external defence and operational jointness with allied forces.

2.2 Balancing Act Under Marcos Jr.

Despite the deepening US alignment, Marcos Jr. has not abandoned engagement with Beijing. As 2026 ASEAN Chair, the Philippines is seeking to de-escalate South China Sea tensions through diplomatic channels even as near-clashes between Philippine and Chinese maritime forces continue near Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal. This dual-track approach—military hardening with the US, diplomatic engagement with China—reflects Manila’s recognition that it cannot afford to fully decouple from its largest regional economic partner.

2.3 Iran Conflict: The Energy Emergency

The 2026 Iran war has exposed the Philippines’ most critical structural vulnerability: its near-total dependence on imported oil. The country imports 95–98% of its crude, predominantly from the Middle East. The disruption of Hormuz shipping triggered by the US–Israel strikes on Iran has produced a full-blown energy emergency.

National Energy Emergency: President Marcos declared a national energy emergency as fuel reserves face depletion by end-June 2026. Fuel prices have reached historic highs, triggering transport strikes and protests.

Direct Talks with Iran: As of 1 April 2026, Foreign Affairs Secretary Lazaro and Energy Secretary Garin met with Iran’s ambassador to negotiate unrestricted passage for Philippine-bound oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz.

OFW Exposure: Over 2.4 million Overseas Filipino Workers are deployed across Gulf states, creating a massive humanitarian liability in an active conflict zone.

Strategic Contradiction: The Philippines’ closest military ally (the US) initiated the strikes that are causing its energy crisis—a tension that Beijing-aligned commentators have been quick to highlight.

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3. Malaysia: Strategic Ambiguity Under Maximum Pressure

3.1 US–China Axis

Malaysia’s geopolitical positioning is defined by a deliberate and sophisticated hedging strategy that Anwar Ibrahim has elevated to an art form. China has been Malaysia’s largest trading partner for nearly two decades, while the United States remains a top source of foreign direct investment. For Putrajaya, the operative conjunction is ‘and’ not ‘or’ when it comes to the two superpowers.

The ‘pulling sideways’ doctrine involves maintaining robust economic ties with China while engaging in security cooperation with the US and its allies. Anwar hosted both Xi Jinping and Donald Trump warmly in 2025, and reportedly played a facilitative role in smoothing US–China dynamics at the APEC summit. The RM25 billion National Semiconductor Strategy positions Malaysia as a neutral manufacturing hub, explicitly pitching Penang and Selangor as non-aligned alternatives in the global chip war.

Malaysia’s BRICS+ membership aspiration adds another dimension: while some interpret this as a tilt toward Beijing, it is more accurately understood as portfolio diversification—building institutional alternatives that reduce dependency on any single power bloc.

3.2 South China Sea Calculus

Malaysia’s overlapping claims with China in the South China Sea represent a persistent but carefully managed tension. Unlike the Philippines, which has pursued confrontational transparency initiatives, Malaysia has adopted a quieter approach—preferring diplomatic engagement over public confrontation while quietly building its own maritime capabilities. This approach has drawn criticism from some quarters as ‘spineless,’ but it reflects Kuala Lumpur’s realistic assessment of its own military limitations and its calculation that economic leverage is more effective than military posturing.

3.3 Iran Conflict: Vocal Condemnation, Quiet Action

Malaysia’s response to the Iran war has been the most emotionally resonant of the three countries. Anwar Ibrahim tabled an emergency motion in Parliament on 2 March 2026, producing a rare cross-party consensus condemning the US–Israel strikes as a ‘vile attempt’ to sabotage peace negotiations. This parliamentary unity was a significant political moment in a country where partisan divisions are typically sharp.

Behind the public rhetoric, however, Malaysia’s operational posture is carefully calibrated. Anwar personally called the Iranian President urging restraint and diplomacy—practicing what analysts describe as ‘quiescent diplomacy’ rather than loud activism. This approach preserves Malaysia’s credibility as a neutral interlocutor while satisfying domestic Muslim solidarity sentiment.

Economic Impact: Rising costs of imported refined petroleum and surging maritime insurance premiums for Hormuz shipping are partially offset by gains in Malaysia’s oil and gas sector. The net effect is manageable but not negligible.

Defence Procurement Dilemma: Despite criticising the US over Iran, Malaysia’s biggest military exercise partner remains the Americans, and many operational assets are US-origin. Procurement decisions are now caught between domestic political imperatives, foreign policy positioning, and pragmatic defence needs.

Diplomatic Architecture: Malaysia is carefully maintaining its links with ASEAN, GCC, and China simultaneously, avoiding any appearance of choosing sides that could compromise its broader diplomatic architecture.

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4. Comparative Assessment

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5. Implications for Malaysia

5.1 Relative Positioning

Viewed comparatively, Malaysia’s hedging strategy occupies a middle ground between Thailand’s structural drift toward Beijing and the Philippines’ deepening alignment with Washington. This positioning offers both advantages and risks. Malaysia retains more diplomatic flexibility than either neighbour, but it also faces the constant threat of being squeezed from both sides as great-power competition intensifies.

5.2 Iran Conflict Differential

Malaysia’s exposure to the Iran conflict is qualitatively different from the Philippines. Where Manila faces an existential energy crisis requiring direct negotiation with Tehran, Kuala Lumpur’s oil and gas production provides a partial buffer. The political dynamics are also distinct: Malaysia’s Muslim-majority population creates stronger domestic pressure for solidarity with Iran, while the Philippines’ concern is primarily economic and humanitarian (OFW safety).

5.3 US–Malaysia ART Trade Situation

The ongoing US–Malaysia trade tensions add a layer of complexity that neither Thailand nor the Philippines faces in quite the same way. Malaysia’s semiconductor ambitions make it both a prize and a potential casualty of the US–China tech war. Washington’s willingness to impose reciprocal tariffs on allied and neutral countries alike means that Malaysia’s non-aligned positioning does not insulate it from American economic pressure.

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6. Outlook

The three countries’ divergent strategies reflect not just different leadership calculations but fundamentally different structural positions: Thailand’s continental geography pulls it toward China; the Philippines’ maritime exposure and security needs pull it toward the US; Malaysia’s trade-dependent economy and Muslim-majority population create unique cross-pressures that demand a more complex balancing act.

The 2026 Iran conflict has added an unexpected third axis to what was previously a bilateral US–China competition framework. For the Philippines, it has exposed a critical energy vulnerability. For Malaysia, it has tested the limits of quiet diplomacy. For Thailand, it has reinforced the logic of disengagement from Western strategic frameworks. How each country navigates the remainder of this crisis will shape Southeast Asian geopolitics for years to come.

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Ilahi anta maqsudi wa ridhaka matlubi, a’tini mahabbataka wa ma’rifataka

Disclaimer: This analysis is based on open-source intelligence and reflects the author’s independent assessment. It does not represent the official position of any government, institution, or organisation. Information is current as of 1 April 2026.